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Abstract 
The question of what characterizes communication in Swedish moose management and how 
this reflects the concept of adaptive management has challenged the need for a thorough 
exploration of how stakeholders in decision-making processes jointly coordinate their 
knowledge. Adaptive management is itself a concept that has gained significant space in 
natural resource management literature, in which the recognition is that there is a perceived 
need to manage resources on a continuous basis, as well as the requirement of diverse 
stakeholders to convene and generate the knowledge needed to face uncertain situations and 
to learn from them. This requirement rests on the tacit assumption that concerned stakeholders 
need to intersubjectively co-construct their understandings by ways of coordinating 
knowledge through a communicative format that nurtures the adaptive capacity in response to 
both ecological and social changes. When this capacity is reduced, so are the opportunities 
that enable the advocated potentials for successful management that this concept rests upon. 
The aim of this thesis is to analyze and describe whether the accomplishment of decision-
making processes within a moose management group apply the criteria needed to accomplish 
the normative ideals of adaptive management and to discuss possible consequences that may 
arise when these ideals are not met. By using discursive closures and openings as theoretical 
concepts to operationalize communicative rationality, the communicative practices for a 
moose management group have been characterized through the analysis of a systematic 
interpretation of meanings in order to ascertain how knowledge is coordinated within the 
group. Presented as a single case study, the meeting held by this group provided ample 
material for analysis which has been categorized into six episodes, revealing several 
discursive closures as well as openings. The presence of discursive closures, partly in 
combination with a conceptual use of elements of uncertainty and conflicts, yielded 
systematic exclusions of knowledge, values and perspectives. The effect of these practices, 
which narrow the scope for divergent perspectives to be expressed that, if elaborated upon, 
may have been of potential relevance for management but which could not be assessed as 
claims to validity, were not rationally pursued. Consequently, opportunities for adaptive 
management were reduced. The findings presented in this paper raise the issue of whether 
such management groups can develop a procedural communicative format in which 
interaction is guided towards understanding by a systematic exclusion of discursive closures 
that otherwise discourage such a format. It follows that there also is a need to investigate a 
wider range of groups to determine a more general view on how discursive closures appear 
and what function they serve in terms of adaptive prospects.  
Abbreviations 
AM – Adaptive management 
MMA – Moose management area 
MMG – Moose management group 
MMU – Moose management area 
NRM – Natural resource management 
SMM – Swedish moose management  
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Introduction  
“Management itself is a discipline born from the coming together of old knowledge, from 
diverse sources, into new perspectives.” 
- Frances Westley (1995 p. 392) 
Several studies on participatory natural resource management (NRM), which include adaptive 
management (AM) and its practical application particularly with respect to conflicts and the 
process of decision-making, increasingly support the role of communication as means to 
coordinate understanding between stakeholders by means of facilitating dialogue (Holling 
1978; Gunderson 1999; Johnson and Walker 2000; Ravnborg and Westermann 2001; Stringer 
et al. 2006). The ways in which actors claim and respond to the validity of knowledge and the 
experience they express, guides intersubjectively the interaction toward or away from the 
exploration of their representations of reality and expressions of knowledge and values; that 
is, the way actors coordinate their knowledge. 
 
Modern NRM calls for a more inclusive participatory approach as a way of responding to the 
complex web of diverse values and interests by which the role of science be tailored to those 
needs in relation to decision-making (Johnson and Walker 2000). Accordingly, modern NRM 
is normatively placed in the paradigm of participatory democracy, (which appeals to 
deliberative democracy discourse (cf. Smith 2003)) by which power to generate decisions 
become locally positioned, as opposed to representative democracy (Buchy and Hoverman 
2000; Stringer et al. 2006). Inclusiveness and unconstrained dialogue are two essential 
elements enabling the potential for legitimacy of collectively established decisions in a 
deliberative democratic (normative) context (Smith 2003).  Consequently, such features 
appear to be commonly, however occasionally implicitly, admired in the emerging AM 
discourse as well. 
 
Swedish moose management (SMM) recently became reformed to include AM as the basis 
for this new management-structure. The proposition underlying this new approach to 
management (prop. 2009/10:239 p. 27) explicitly made use of the value of a participatory 
approach based on “extensive dialogue” between stakeholders arguing that management must 
be coherent across larger regions. “Stakeholders” can throughout this case be defined to 
include hunters, landowners and other actors that hold a defined interest explicitly recognized 
by other actors as relevant to the managed area in question. The argument seems to be based 
on the view that the ecosystem, which the moose (Alces alces) is part of, involves a complex 
web of interacting (non-linear) units, and equally important, so does the social dynamics 
involved in management. Accordingly, it appears to be assumed that the uncertainty of social 
dynamics can be reduced through communication as means of coordinating the actions that 
are needed to respond to the uncertain complexities of the ecosystem to be managed. Stringer 
et al. (2006) note that the participatory dimension has been much overlooked in terms of its 
place and meaning with regard to the AM approach, particularly with respect to the process of 
decision making. Thus, the social mechanisms generated through participation and the process 
of decision making deserves to be explored and identified, otherwise this aspect of AM which 
governs the outcome of new policies may not be rooted on the diversity of values and 
interests that supposedly is a key element in this type of management approach.  
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The aim of this thesis is to analyze and describe whether the accomplishment of decision-
making processes within a moose management group apply the criteria needed to accomplish 
the normative ideals of adaptive management and to discuss possible consequences that may 
arise when these ideals are not met. As already indicated, there are several studies contending 
that there are shortcomings in the ways stakeholders jointly pursue matters in situations when 
they are brought together, particularly when decisions are to be made. Having a third party to 
facilitate dialogue (Stringer et al. 2006), or using different formats of communication ranging 
from individual meetings to workshops (Holling 1978; Gunderson 1999) are proposed ways 
to counteract such shortcomings. It is also argued that ingredients for the potential success of 
AM includes a variety of stakeholders (Stringer et al. 2006), flexibility within social 
institutions (e.g. Holling and Meffe 1996) (that is, the infringement of learned practices within 
institutions that are recreated from the inside of institutions which deny novel ideas from the 
creative event horizon outside those institutions), as well as a denial of external imposition on 
discourse (Gunderson (1999 p. 6) mentions political steering mechanisms as an example).  
Thus, with reference to the previously stated, poorly coordinated communication (oriented 
away from intersubjective explorations) among participants in decision-making processes 
hence increases the tendency for fragile policies which may contain underlying suppressed or 
neglected conflicting interests and values, as they have not been established on intersubjective 
understandings. This closes the range of opportunities for potentially relevant knowledge to 
emerge when stakeholders convene.  
 
The ways in which stakeholders intersubjectively coordinate their understandings and 
representations of knowledge by acts of validating claims (communicative rationality) rests on 
the assumption that the adaptive capacity of management is enhanced when situations are co-
created for the elaboration of such acts. Without such a format for communication, the 
normative elements that frame management as “adaptive” will not be met.  To assess and 
define such a format, I employ the theoretical concepts “discursive closures” (Deetz 1992) as 
well as, albeit less firmly defined, “discursive openings” (Ångman 2013) as means to 
operationalize communicative rationality and consequently assess the coordination of 
knowledge based on empirical material that was generated from observing a meeting taking 
place by a regionally established moose management group in Sweden. 
 
Subsequently, this paper will elaborate on what composes the normative stance of AM and its 
corresponding practical application supposedly employed by the SMM in order to give an 
account for the communicative aspects that I seek to highlight.  There appears to be 
considerable research indicating that the interplay among stakeholders is of significant 
importance for how AM is realized. There is however, less research providing insight in how 
such interplay appears, thereby providing insights as to what opportunities for adaptive 
management actually exists in specific cases.  The following questions have spurred the 
format for this paper: (1) What characterizes communication in terms of knowledge 
coordination and procedural meta-communication among decision making groups within the 
Swedish moose management with its aim towards adaptive management? (2) In what ways 
does this communicative character manifest itself with respect to participants’ exploration and 
validation of each other’s perspectives and knowledge in relation to their own knowledge and 
reality? (3) Finally, in what ways do uncertainty and learning, two central aspects of AM, 
appear to influence, or be influenced by, these communicative parameters? 
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The structure of Swedish moose management and adaptive management 
In early 2012, SMM became reformed as an organization that is “ecosystem based” with AM 
as a rendered benchmark as means to generate new knowledge (prop. 2009/10 p. 20). The 
main reason for implementing this concept posited by the Swedish government was to 
remodel the current system to one that promotes local management as means to obtain “a 
moose stock of high quality that is in balance with grazing resources” (prop. 2009/10:239 p. 
16, author’s translation). Accordingly, management were to include a platform where several 
different interests come together, such as interests concerning moose- related accidents and 
grazing damage of forests. Hence, it should generate a situation in which diverse interests are 
met whilst promoting a moose stock that meets several different indicators, such as genetic 
diversity, sex ratio, and health, contributing to a moose stock of high quality (prop. 
2009/10:239 p. 22) relative to the interests that define ‘quality’ in this sense. 
 
Perhaps the most significant structural change in SMM, and in response to conceptualized 
goals of AM, is the application of the concept “ecosystem-based,” which here refers to the 
recognition that animals do not live by the constructed boundaries humans have applied (e.g. 
county borders), but extend according to their own natural and geographical limitations. This 
is the reason why moose management areas (MMA; sw. älgförvaltningsområde) have been 
established. These areas are formed by reference to the natural geographical location of a 
moose stock (prop. 2009/10:239 p. 23,25). The MMAs are led by appointed representatives 
from landowner –and hunting organizations, comprising a total of three hunters and three 
landowners to form a moose management group (MMG). The chairman of the MMG 
represents the interests of the landowners (SFS 1987:905§3d) because they “have the 
responsibilities of the forest,” (prop. 2009/10:239 p. 26, author’s translation; SFS 1979:429 1 
& 8§§) and thus have right to the decisive vote (SFS 1987:905§3d). 
 
The MMG has responsibility of its respective MMA, and within a MMA there exist several 
moose management units, (MMU; sw. älgskötselområde) as well as license areas. These areas 
are defined by size and number and type of moose (i.e. calf or adult) that can viably be killed 
within it (SFS 1987:259§33). Accordingly, they can be categorized as subunits of the MMA. 
As local management is emphasized, the MMGs are to engage in dialogue with hunters, 
landowners and other stakeholders. These stakeholders are the ones who typically perform the 
inventories that provide information concerning the status of moose and land (prop. 
2009/10:239 p. 27). Taken together with information from other interest areas (such as 
moose-related traffic accidents), the MMGs main task is to formulate goals on how to manage 
the moose stock in a management plan (which is an all encompassing plan for the area) (SFS 
1987:905§3d) that further informs the moose management plans established by the MMUs. 
As mentioned earlier, the proposition formed by the Swedish government that led to the 
implementation of these changes (prop. 2009/10:239 p. 27) emphasized that a management 
plan should be based on extensive dialogue with the stakeholders of the subunits, particularly 
the MMUs (as they comprise the largest type of subunit within the MMA). It is stated that a 
“good dialogue” is presupposed in order for the management as a whole (the whole being the 
MMA and its defined moose stock) to adapt to its subunits (mainly the MMUs but also 
hunting parties and other interest organizations) and vice versa, which should be done on a 
regular basis. At this point I wish to caution that I use “adapt” and “adaptability” analogous to 
the ways “adaptive” are applied as part of the concept of AM. To adapt is to retain potent 
abilities to respond in the face of changes in social and ecological responses that may have 
potential to enable for maintaining or even improving upon new conditions compared to the 
initial state (cf. Folke et al. 2005 p. 463). With reference to the previously mentioned, the call 
for ‘extensive dialogue’ between part-whole amongst the units is supposed to serve as 
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foundation for a synchronized hunting of the moose stock (prop. 2009/10:239 p. 38). Hence, it 
appears that communication is expected to guide actions in a manner that responds to a 
changing social and ecological environment. 
 
Based on reasoning from (prop. 2009/10:239); the definition of AM applied in SMM 
emphasizes the process of learning as a vital component through constantly adjusting goals 
and thereby accumulating new and reliable knowledge, not only about the ecosystem to be 
managed, but also the people and their relations with each other with respect to the ecosystem. 
As the ecosystem and actors (stakeholders and other actors who interact with the system) 
change, so does the knowledge that is gained through inventories. Furthermore, SMM is said 
to be grounded on local participation in order to enable legitimacy of decisions through 
influence by local stakeholders, thereby contributing to a holistic view of AM (prop. 
2009/10:239 p. 16,19,21). However, AM as a concept needs further elaboration in order to 
corroborate on the meanings that have been applied from theory to practice in SMM. 
The main aspects of adaptive management  
Throughout the previous decades, NRM has repeatedly been criticized by researchers 
insisting that such management fails to embrace uncertainty of ecosystem dynamics and 
responses to disturbances that result in unexpected outcomes (Johnson & Walker 2000; Balint 
et al. 2011). Previous attempts to manage natural resources has been guided by what is called 
a “command-and-control” approach, which operates by the expectation that  we can predict 
and control nature, and assumes that problems that arise are linear and can be isolated 
(reduced to its parts), which oftentimes is not the case (Holling and Meffe 1996). 
Uncertainties that arise have, for example been approached by denial or by trivialization of 
the problem (Gunderson 1999), and when failure indeed becomes pronounced, it become 
suppressed as opposed to an opportunity for learning by perceiving setbacks as experimental 
opportunities (Walters & Hilborn 1978). Furthermore, NRM situations generally attract a 
considerable amount of stakeholders, who provide the potential of a vast variety of 
perspectives, but also a greater demand on corresponding implementable policies that can 
accommodate this vastness (Gilmour, Walkerden and Scandol 1999). In response to such 
perceived deficiencies, a new paradigm involving preconditions for “sustainability” in NRM 
evolved into the concept known as AM (Balint et al. 2011). Accordingly, scholars have in 
recent times begun to develop an appreciation for the understanding of non-linear social (and 
ecological) dynamics that accompanies the diversity of values and interests along the 
continuum of multiple stakeholders, as well as an emphasis on communication within this 
non-linearity of relations (e.g. Johnson and Walker 2000; Walters 1997).  
 
AM is a method which is suggested to be used when there is an acknowledgment that one 
cannot have complete knowledge about the natural resources to be managed, as well as to 
accept that to craft interventions based on incomplete knowledge will be met with uncertainty, 
risk-taking and surprises (e.g. Walters 1986; Lee 1999; Balint et al. 2011). This is intimately 
bound to the resilience of ecosystems (Gunderson, Holling and Light 1995). The 
“unexpected” is viewed as a pool of events that offers opportunity to learn, and learning 
becomes the coping mechanism for surprises whenever they arise. Uncertainty is a concept 
used to refer to large-scale ecosystems in which the dynamic ecological interactions yield a 
high degree of complexity that is too great to comprehensibly predict (Balint et al. 2011), and 
a surprise is the disturbance between expectations and observations (Gunderson 1999). This is 
one of the main reasons why AM generally emphasizes learning by doing. Experiments are 
conducted based on current knowledge as means to refine knowledge in order to face and 
manage an ever changing system. This method thus aims for uncertainty-reduction through 
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learning (Satterstrom et al. 2005; Johnsson 1999), and continuous learning is that which lays 
the foundation for AM (Walters 1986). This renders it as an inductive approach by ways of 
merging understanding with action whilst recognizing pre-theoretical knowledge as “pseudo-
facts” to deductively complement the learning process (Gunderson, Holling and Light 1995). 
Consequently, Gunderson asserts that; “…most policies are really questions masquerading as 
answers” (Gunderson 1999 p. 2). It follows that policies should ideally be founded with the 
expectation that they will have to become revised or modified on the basis of what is learned 
from unexpected consequences in uncertain situations. The notion of what a policy is, hence 
becomes modified to be regarded as an experiment to be carried out in order to provoke a 
response from which the policy needs to systematically adjust to continuously alter its 
experimental parameters which are carried out through managerial actions (Johnsson 1999; 
Lee 1995). Policies need to carry high experimental value and its outcome need be 
comprehensibly utilized, and this implies taking risks (Walters 2007). Risk is, as Johnson 
insightfully asserts; a matter of definition and is therefore “…more a social than a scientific 
question” (Johnson 1999 p. 3). Actions taken therefore depend on how resource issues are 
defined (Gunderson, Holling and Light 1995), and this owes to how such issues are 
constructed during interaction. This, in turn, depends on how representations of knowledge 
are pursued in communicative settings, which has consequences for how AM subsequently is 
carried out in practice.  
From theory to practice – what has been learned? 
Even though AM as a method is appealing in NRM discourse, there are yet great differences 
between its theoretical and practical application. Being part of several case studies where only 
a fraction have been successful, Walters (2007) stresses above all the need for a key 
individual who hold the capability needed to follow through with the implementation. 
Equally, Gilmour, Walkerden and Scandol (1999) argue for that one individual, whom they 
refer to as the “institutional champion,” that can carry the normative ideal of AM into an 
implemented state. Accordingly, both authors refer to a situation in which an institutional 
rearrangement has taken place, and which in such cases has been scaled down to emphasize 
one actor who made it possible by fertilizing the institution with flexibility. Gunderson (1999 
p. 6) concludes that informally established relations among stakeholders appear to influence 
the accomplishment of successfully applying AM, by which he argues that such informality 
alleviates political external pressure. Thus, such a process has not been confined to 
institutional parameters, but rather grown out of them. The above mentioned authors have 
focused on individual actors and/or the relations between them, implying that such elements 
are important for the success for AM, which may indeed be valid arguments. There is, 
however, the bigger issue to locate potentials for change and opportunities in the way actors 
jointly co-construct and manage knowledge as it emerges through discourses. Key individuals 
or informal relations may be a result of this, but as I will argue later on, is not where one 
should begin to locate such accomplishments.  
 
What most research findings presented thus far have in common confirms what Jonsson 
(1999) suggests by his review; that the greatest challenges of implementing AM are social 
rather than scientific. Johnson (1999 p. 3) concludes that stakeholders’ knowledge 
contribution is essential and requires an ‘open discussion’, as well as the promotion 
institutional flexibility and risk-taking. Furthermore, it appears that it is common, albeit 
somewhat implicit knowledge in AM discourse (e.g. Holling 1978; Gunderson 1999; 
Gilmour, Walkerden and Scandol 1999; Walkerden 2006; Walters 2007) that the adaptability 
of management and response to uncertainties intimately depends on ideas that have not been 
previously applied nor thought of within the managerial institutions and related discourses, 
that is, a creative or intuitive approach to exploration of understandings of both ecological and 
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social systems. The success behind the implementation of AM seems to rest on the plurality 
of ideas or hypotheses that gain mandate through understanding the intrinsic meaning they 
hold, allowing for an intelligible comparison (Gunderson 1999). Accordingly, it appears that 
individual contributions of understanding were in these cases partly made possible because 
the participants were not guided by a formal bureaucratic structure of interaction that 
otherwise would stifle an engagement of a rational exchange of knowledge.  
Managing conflicts  
It has, throughout this paper, been emphasized that which necessitates AM is chiefly 
experimentation, uncertainty, surprises and risk-taking. Yet, experimenting with an ecosystem 
also involves experimenting with the social arrangements that comprise the need to manage 
the ecosystem in the first place, and conflicts are commonplace (Lee 1999). Walkerden (2006) 
argues that AM practices have not taken the issue of conflict resolution into any considerable 
account, and conflicts cannot be resolved if not concerned stakeholders are included 
throughout the process. Walkerden (2006) stresses the need for a forum in which actors can 
negotiate their knowledge by exploring problems in such a way that interests among 
stakeholders become emphasized, as opposed to the positions they supposedly represent. This 
arguably opens up the dialogue and pave way for a joint exploration, as it were.  
 
It was in the beginning of this paper contented that modern NRM situations generally attracts 
actors with different perspectives and values which places pressure on accommodating 
policies (e.g. Gilmour, Walkerden and Scandol 1999), which paradoxically can also be a 
strength for AM (Stringer et al. 2006). However, a vast quantity and variety of stakeholders 
also runs a risk of obscuring perspectives on behalf of one that dominates all the other, 
thereby increasing previously polarized issues, which Arnold, Koro-Ljungberg and Bartels 
(2012 p. 10) have shown as being done through subtle practices operating as a deciding 
mechanism on what the ‘right’ interpretation of a situation should be, such as the use of 
‘expert knowledge’ as means of closing competing perspectives. The restricted flexibility 
through structural barriers and the inevitability of conflicts that will emerge during the process 
and potentially stall decision making, calls for a social context that brings about legitimacy 
(Balint et al. 2011; Lee 1999), and durable policies require that conflicts are engaged in 
(Walkerden 2006). Hence, just like the unexpected should be anticipated, so should conflicts, 
and they should not be suppressed nor avoided- they should as Lee (1999 p. 7) says, be 
“welcomed” insofar as they are within the frames of a process in which the emerging 
properties of the conflict can be acknowledged as legitimate.  
A process of elaborating understanding 
A vital component in AM appears to be how complex understanding of an ecosystem can be 
made intelligible in order for decision makers and managers to establish and carry out policies 
based on such knowledge (Gunderson 1999). The implicit notion seems to be that such 
knowledge needs to be communicated in such a way that the validity of its meanings will not 
be distorted between the stakeholders amongst whom it is co-constructed and represented. 
Equally, the proclaimed creative thinking mentioned earlier, alleviated through absence of 
institutional constraints is indicative of a process in which actors collectively enable diverse 
contributions of interests, values and knowledge to emerge through a rational engagement in 
discourses pertaining to management. Arnold, Koro-Ljungberg and Bartels (2012 p. 1) point 
out that AM regards relevant knowledge to be a property of all stakeholders involved, and that 
facilitators are becoming more commonplace acting as emancipatory agents for such 
knowledge to become part of joint solutions by means of defining and alleviating differences, 
thereby facilitating legitimate formats for communication. Different sources of knowledge are 
of great value, not only because they might contribute to a greater understanding of the 
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ecosystem and ways of adapting, but also, as Lee (1999 p. 6) points out, information can be 
obtained rather inexpensively by the actors who know most about the system, the ones who 
operate within it and that have the opportunities to quickly perceive changes within it. 
Epistemologically rendered, then, infers that individual perceptions of reality and 
representation of knowledge yield possibly relevant and important information about 
changing conditions of the system to be managed. Stakeholders (and scientists) involved 
throughout the process of AM need to explore ways of communicating in a manner that 
excludes potential for misunderstandings. The difficulties, according to Holling (1978 pp. 
130-131), is to find the border between intelligibility and validity behind any given assertion, 
although he specifically refers to the communicating by scientists of complex information and 
stakeholders. Additionally, Holling (1978) seems to relate communication through cybernetic 
assumptions whereas this paper assumes the direction of symbolic interactionism by placing 
emphasis on the interplay between stakeholders which are viewed as actors who actively, 
reflexively, and intersubjectively co-construct their understandings through the use of 
symbols (e.g. Craig and Muller 2007). These differences in assumptions have implications for 
how knowledge and understanding is viewed to shape the nature of management, even though 
the normative elements remain the same (that is, to promote understanding and learning in 
response to changing ecological and social conditions). Buchy and Hoverman (2000) claim 
that understanding occurs among participants once they begin to negotiate in decision-making 
processes. They also add that participatory NRM local-level processes that have been 
instrumental in achieving a better outcome for the environment have yet to be explored due to 
lack of information.  
 
By reference to the arguments provided, it is reasonable to assert that, without a 
communicative foundation that promotes understanding between stakeholders and other 
actors involved in the process of adaptive management, the ability of responding to changing 
conditions in both social and ecological environments will not be retained if those responses 
are not adequately understood. A type of communicative format that engenders a legitimate 
foundation for participants to explore conflicts and more generally, where there are incentives 
to understand other stakeholder’s interests for the sake of a mutual outcome, may appear as an 
impractical, even perhaps utopian, vision. There is nevertheless considerable research 
indicating the contrary by implicitly motioning for a critical investigation of how stakeholders 
jointly make sense of and pursue matters. Such a format need be permeated through all levels 
of NRM, from assessment to decision making, otherwise the normative ideals of AM will not 
be realized. 
Incentives to investigate communicative processes within AM 
It has been argued thus far that the underlying mechanisms governing the outcomes of 
management carry great importance. There is an apparent merit in exploring the process 
underlying decisions and the actions that follows. 
 
Throughout this paper it has been time and again asserted that there are obvious concerns to 
be raised when actors are brought together who have various interests, values and 
perspectives on reality which is also a contributor to the ways in which knowledge is 
perceived, generated and presented. All of this is in constant motion, and it changes. AM has 
been regarded a successful undertaking when there is variety of knowledge representations 
involved and favorably compared through mutual understandings (e.g. Gunderson 1997). 
Such a process is therefore highly dynamic as well and requires a forum that enables 
legitimacy (Balint et al. 2011; Walkerden 2006: Lee 1999). Other elements perceived as 
crucial behind successful implementation of AM have been contended to be based on one 
distinguished actor who serves as a catalyst throughout the process and can motivate a leap 
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beyond institutional boundaries (Walters 2007; Gilmour, Walkerden and Scandol 1999), 
informal relations, again with respect to institutional constraints, enabling a creative 
development of novel ideas (Gunderson 1999). However, these “successful” elements are 
outcomes, or if you will, accomplishments, from processes of interaction continuously taking 
place. Opportunities for change lie within these processes as they are presently happening, 
which is why it is in this paper contended that it is during situations when actors 
intersubjectively build their understandings of matters by means of communicating that one 
needs to place an initial focus. In applying AM, SMM normatively pursues “extensive 
dialogue” as means to guide (collective) action in response to changes in ecological and social 
conditions, uncertainties and surprises, by maintaining or improve upon them, i.e. adapting. 
Were it not for the tacit recognition that communication is expected to serve as a tool for 
coordinating such responses, thereby facilitating acquisition of new knowledge to inform new 
goals for management, then adapting to changing conditions would not require coherence 
among stakeholders by ways of interaction. That being said, such arguments bear witness to a 
considerable body of research indicating that opportunities and changes reside within the 
ongoing development throughout the process of AM. Novel ideas nurtured by creativity and 
oscillating between institutional and informal borders as well as distinguished actors, are all 
factors that are emergent properties arisen throughout a process of interaction among various 
stakeholders. Yet, there are only a lesser amount of studies with respect to AM that engage in 
describing such processes in detail (such as Arnold, Koro-Ljungberg and Bartels 2012), in 
which various actors engage with one another, constructing or reproducing the various 
elements that embody the products that seemingly become of a more popular targets for 
research. Llewellyn and Hindmarsch (2011 p. 10) equally contended, in referring to 
organizational studies, that a majority of publications have been concerned about the outcome 
of interaction, rather than interaction itself, or to use their own words: “… [the ongoing 
activities within organizations] tends to be reduced to something that is amenable to casual 
observation and description” (Llewellyn and Hindmarsch 2011 pp. 12-13).  It follows that 
perceived elements such as “key individuals” (e.g. Walters 2007 p. 306) or “informal 
relations” (Gunderson 1999 p. 6) that supposedly generates a process needed to enforce AM 
as a concept into an implemented state are such reduced elements that does not account for 
the intersubjective understandings of such emergent properties that gave rise to them. Nor do 
such descriptions provide any specific insights as to what ongoing interactions actually 
resulted in the positive development of AM that these authors defined. Accordingly, if one is 
to locate opportunities for change, there is a need to initiate research in the ways actors jointly 
practice AM.   
 
If one is to argue that management is adaptive, one needs to account for the actual ongoing 
interactions that shape the management in question. If, for instance, one solely looks at the 
ways stakeholders perceive recent accomplishments, such as a meeting taking place in 
general, a settled decision, conflicting values or interests and so on, it becomes difficult to 
account for how these stakeholders actively relate to, and therefore presently make sense of, 
such outcomes as they are actually taking place. Against such an analysis, incentives to 
engage in more, perhaps attractive matters may become more pronounced, as they can 
provoke a qualitative foundation upon which such incentives can reasonable be pursued (cf. 
Llewellyn and Hindmarsch 2011 p. 22). If we grant the argument that AM is a difficult 
undertaking to successfully achieve in practice, then we also need to make the process of 
practice object for observation and analysis. Such a process needs to rest upon a normative 
standard for communicating, and not interaction alone, since AM assumes a process in which 
knowledge should emerge and be integrated in order to adapt to ever changing circumstances. 
It is befitting to call for an interpretative framework which can place focus on how actors in 
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interaction make and validate claims of knowledge, as well as when such opportunities 
become intersubjectively diminished.   
Theory 
Communicative action 
The theory of communicative action by Habermas (2001) presents a potent framework to 
approximate an analytical basis for describing and discussing acts of communication in SMM. 
 
A smooth interaction depends on what Habermas calls “background consensus”, which is 
when claims to validity go unquestioned (Habermas 2001 p. 90). In other words, we enter a 
discourse with the assumption that we will understand and be understood, on the basis of four 
classes of speech acts; intelligibility, truth, normative rightness (relevance) and sincerity. 
When any of these classes becomes subject to questioning (concerning validity), our previous 
assumption of understandings becomes interrupted and we try to reestablish our assumption, 
that is, our background consensus. Habermas separates this “smooth interaction”, placed on 
background consensus as part of communicative action, whereas at the meta-level of 
interaction, corresponding to claims to validity make up the discourse (ibid. p. 100). We enter 
such a discourse by asking questions pertaining to these claims, or by answering them. To put 
it less eloquently, there is not much reason to enter an interaction if we do not believe and 
anticipate that we will understand it. If this was not the case, then we would immediately 
resort to establish communication at the meta-level by explicitly confirming our assumptions 
of an anticipated discourse (ibid. 2001).  
 
When someone presents a perspective, the actor claims that the perspective is intelligible, 
truthful, rightful and sincere (i.e. the perspective is implicitly or explicitly claimed to be 
valid). The assertion representing the perspective which describes a reality that an actor 
ascribes to the present interaction is implicitly or explicitly reciprocated in terms of its 
validity by the other members participating in the discourse. In a question-answer situation, 
the intelligibility of the assertion undergoes an exchange of interpretations (what meaning is 
to be assigned to an object), the claim to truth undergoes clarifications and assertions, the 
normative rightness is treated in terms of relevance behind the statement, and sincerity is met 
with concern about the underlying reasons behind the statement (ibid. pp. 90-91). By the very 
acts of asking questions and by answering them, actors engage in discourse by means of 
understanding the perspective(s) part of the present conversation, granted they are rationally 
motivated to do so (if they anticipate an ideal speech situation, in a sense). Thus, when our 
assumptions of understanding and being understood have been interrupted by acts of such a 
situation, which in turn has been remolded to acts of reciprocations indicating that the actors 
involved in the present interaction agree about the meaning that gave rise to the situation at 
hand, then the assumed consensus has been re-built to an actual one. This is characterized by 
a common (mutual) understanding of the meanings involved. In this case then, we could claim 
that our assumptions regarding understanding of the communicative action and the anticipated 
potential of a discourse have been confirmed. Thus, communication has been guided towards 
understanding. It should be emphasized that when probing various perspectives in a discourse, 
that is, to seek understanding, it does not necessarily require an understanding of others’ sense 
of reality, but may equally regard the reality that is intersubjectively established throughout 
the discourse. In other words, participants can reach an agreement on the meanings involved 
in a discourse to a degree in which they understand each other’s arguments. This means that 
not only can the experience that comprised the initial communicative action be discursively 
redeemable, but so can any experience that arises through discourse as well (ibid. pp. 88-89). 
12 
 
This experience, which has been intersubjectively established, refers to the meta-level about 
the discourse itself which I will touch upon later. 
 
The use of language has a normative (universal) component which can be used as a tool to 
identify the “normative” as a critical template to contrast the actual, present communication 
(cf. Pedersen 2008 p. 467). Thus, Habermas’ theory facilitates the ways in which one can 
interpret communication as being motivated by understanding in discourse, and conversely 
when communication is systematically distorted when claims to validity are not explored. We 
are given a “normative guidance” from which we can discern acts of domination and bring the 
potential of open (conflicting) expressions into light (Deetz 1992 p. 170). 
Discursive closures and openings 
“Good decisions require appropriately distributed information, openness to alternative 
perspectives, and reasoning based on personal insights and data rather than on authority 
relations.”  
- Deetz (1992 p. 178) 
 
Building on Habermas’ theory and on systematic distortion in discourse, Deetz offers an 
analytical concept to highlight situations in which the requirements for when “good 
decisions” are not met. Only when the above conditions are present is interaction discursively 
redeemable through claims to validity (ibid. 1992)  
 
Systematic distortion is described as a production of meaning that, in a participatory setting, 
becomes reproduced in a skewed fashion relative to the participants that are part of the 
discourse (ibid. 1992). Conversely, undistorted communication can be defined as a situation 
in which meaning is equally produced as a property of all participants. In more practical 
terms, systematic distortion in interaction is when one or more perspectives gains advantage 
without a mutual consent based on a rational ground (ibid. 1992), i.e. without an equal 
possibility to question their validity. It is here we can close in on the dividing characteristics 
between understanding guided communication (communicative action) and strategic action, 
by which the former seeks to grasp different meanings and the latter is defined in terms of self 
deception. Self deception makes distortion happen tacitly, it is beyond intentionality and thus 
not necessarily manipulative in the sense that it is applied through one’s practical 
consciousness although it operates alike (ibid. 1992). This implies that being involved in 
discourse hides the systematically distorted character of the discourse and leads to “false 
consensus”, which may be rooted in the logic of the system within which the discourse takes 
shape (ibid. 1992). When discrepant or distinct perspectives are recognized as such, and 
consequently become systematically distorted through strategic action, discursive closure is in 
effect. The potential for conflict which generates understanding through those perspectives 
that may offer possibility to move outside the frames by following the subject matter as an 
“open development of understanding” (ibid. p. 188) from which novelty might spring, 
becomes diverted through discursive closure. Accordingly, discursive closure entails 
systematically distorted communication as means to avoid or suppress conflicts, whereas 
systematic distortion (generally applied) refers to the communicative system in its entity 
(Thackaberry 2004). Note that it is assumed here that conflicts, in situations where 
agreements and/or decisions are to be made, are inevitable. If the potential for conflicting 
perspectives and knowledge is not a “welcomed” entity to initiate and sustain discourses, it 
can but only be suppressed or avoided altogether, and consequently without a mutual consent.  
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Although the reversed concept, “discursive openings”, has yet to be properly defined 
(Ångman 2013), it may arguably refer to moments when production of meaning is equally 
aligned by all interacting participants. Conflicts can emerge on a basis that is perceived 
meaningful for development of mutual understanding of the differences in perspectives by 
meeting the criteria of claims to validity. To use Deetz’s language: A “…reopening [of] the 
exploration of the private, social and external world” (Deetz 1992 p. 176), as it were. Thus, a 
key to identify discursive openings points towards moments when actors question previously 
established assumptions of procedures and rules and consequently initiate seemingly novel 
discourses that can be viewed as distinguished from precedent ones (Thackaberry 2004). 
Discursive openings can also be qualified as such when discursive closures are recognized 
and communicated about, i.e. meta-communicated (Ångman 2013), which thus implies that 
the discursive closure in and of itself becomes an object for claims to validity. Such a 
procedural undertaking can enable mutual learning (Ångman 2013). 
 
Deetz offers different orientations (which he defines as tacit “micro practices”) through which 
discursive closures originate, namely: disqualification, naturalization, neutralization, topical 
avoidance, subjectification of experience, meaning denial, legitimation, and pacification 
(Deetz 1992 pp. 189-198). Most of these micro practices presented below are explicated with 
fictitious examples derived from the present theme of this study. Accordingly, the process of 
disqualification is the practice by which equally plausible perspectives become denied by 
appealing to normative standards of who is the most relevant actor to speak. This is done by 
insisting on who is the most knowledgeable (expert or layman on an issue and other 
(dis)qualifying notions) (ibid. 1992) or maintaining that one’s knowledge is irrelevant because 
it is claimed through personal interests. Such a practice operates through contentions such as 
“you are a major landowner and you would not be saying this were it not because of your 
financial incentives”. The result is the delegitimizing of possibly relevant views from a 
discourse that may have potential to contribute more symmetrical understandings between 
participants. Through the Marxist concept of “reification”, Deetz offers a related aspect, 
namely naturalization which is the practice through which something is introduced as “given 
in nature” which operates as ways to hide any subjectivity (ibid. 1992). Thus, naturalizing 
statements may be expressed as “hunters never care about the forest” or “moose cause traffic 
accidents” which brings about a perspective as the absolute truth behind the way something is. 
In close proximity to naturalization, neutralization which is the practice that operates by 
obscuring value-positions and conveys such positions as value-neutral (ibid. 1992). Assuming 
that there is only one objective world and one single claim belongs to it, such as the assertion 
that “the report shows that damage on spruce has increased by 15 percent,” which conceals 
the criteria chosen for generating such ‘facts’. Topical avoidance is simply put, the evasion of 
specific topics or issues called upon in response to evade a possible disorder that can result in 
antagonism. A potential conflict hence becomes avoided, and decisions are made around “safe 
issues” (ibid. 1992), and the scope of the decision becomes reduced accordingly. 
Subjectification of experience occurs when a claim is argued as personally held, saying for 
example; “well if you think that the moose stock has declined, you are obviously entitled to 
your opinion”. This move aims at placing an argument as less valid solely by make it value-
laden framed within that system of values, instead of exploring the valuing-system in itself. 
The perceived difference in values should initiate talk rather as a mean to meta-
communicatively close it, implicitly claiming that such values are less true or relevant than 
another, which in fact offers the opportunity of investigating the issue up close (cf. ibid. p. 
194). The practice of meaning deniability refers to the plurality of meanings embedded in an 
expression and there is a discrepancy between the intended and the resultant meaning. Such 
an expression may appear as someone sarcastically saying “I think we should kill all the 
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wolves because they are eating too much moose,” while maintaining a position indicating that 
the assertion actually should be investigated. In this way, the message has been said and not 
said depending on the response it provokes by which the speaker can disclaim or confirm the 
intended meaning as meant (ibid. 1992). Legitimation occurs through a practice in which one 
system of value is placed above all else that can be invoked when there are contradictions, 
conflicts or complex interpretations, thus claiming to a meaning that pertains to something 
larger than the immediately comprehensible. Accordingly, an insistence of “higher order 
explanatory devices” as Deetz (1992 p. 196) puts it, is portrayed when for instance saying; 
“the biological diversity of the forest and therefore our nation will suffer if we do not take the 
following action”. As such, alternative views may become perceived as irrelevant relative to 
the greater good of the forest and the nation. Pacification, finally, refers to issues that are 
brought into trivial or futile context in order to make them less important or important but 
impossible to deal with. An act of pacification may be read as; “it does not matter what we as 
a MMG think, the Game Management Delegation makes the decision in the end either way”. 
Hence, an issue has been diverted even though it appears as it has been engaged upon (ibid.) 
 
The identification of moments when these micro practices occur, or in their absence 
substituted by openings, presents the possibility to interpret and characterize communicative 
settings as being guided by strategic or understanding actions through situations when such 
moments become (co)constructed by interacting participants. An important analytical 
component in this study, which will be drafted upon in the next section, emanates from the 
importance of, to borrow a term from Cox (2006 p. 12), “communication in action”.  The 
assumption is that discursive closures/openings occur semi-consciously, whereas closures 
operate deceitfully in the quest for mutual understanding, such micro practices are to be found 
in the event horizon of communicative practices. 
 
As argued elsewhere, it is also assumed that for AM to function in practice, the underlying 
communicative processes, from assessment to decision making and subsequent 
implementation, need be characterized by understanding among the actors involved. More 
explicitly put; if actors engaged in management practices persistently and recurrently enter 
and sustain an interaction by strategically accomplishing their activities, they can be expected 
never to concert their actions as they have not been intersubjectively established on rational 
grounds. Those actions will, collectively make little sense as it were, and diminish the 
adaptive capacity to manage ever changing circumstances.  
 
Discursive closures and closures are co-constructed through interaction. Hence when people 
interact, they mutually make decisions on how their conversation should progress (Moberg 
2010), and it is through this progression that people make sense of their realities through the 
sharing of knowledge, experience and perspectives. The micro practices that emerge during 
this (co)construction elucidate the characterizing features of intersubjective understandings 
which in turn can be seen as the precursors to the elements or ‘products’ generated by the 
structure (organization) in question, visible outside the immediate situation as discursive 
representations. The above mentioned assumption is that which signifies the difference 
between studying the process of interaction or the embodied practices from which it emerges. 
The latter is what has been described in much of previous research pertaining to AM (such as 
informal relations or key individuals described earlier), whereas the former is a perspective 
which appears to be sparsely underappreciated and thus has motivated this study, which in 
turn has implications for how AM is viewed as a practical undertaking. Throughout a 
communicative process, actors participate in various ways. By analytically directing ones 
attention towards such a process, the creation of decisions and the process that defines it can 
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be located, which enables the triangulating (charting) of any spatially located opportunities for 
change (Ångman 2013). This will elaborated upon in the next section. 
Method 
The point of departure has been to investigate communicative practices within SMM in 
combination with the pre-established theoretical framework presented here. The site of 
interest was consequently localized to the MMGs. The county of Värmland in the middle of 
Sweden was the target area for investigation due to convenient reasons and contact 
information for the members of the MMGs was provided by the county administration board. 
As these groups arrange their meetings irregularly twice a year, I established contact with the 
chairman from each group early on as they have the mandate to authorize my presence. The 
time for gathering empirical material has been narrow, during which time I have been in 
contact with nine chairmen from two different counties, whereas two of which offered me the 
opportunity to participate. Both meetings have been investigated according a number of 
criteria which are outlined below, however the second meeting did not produce material that 
could generate the type of episodes needed for analysis corresponding to these criteria, which 
is why this paper is presented as a single case study. For the purpose of understanding why 
the second meeting turned out so markedly different from the meeting held by the first group, 
I contacted three out of a total of four members that were involved by asking questions 
pertaining to my own presence as a researcher and how they generally perceive their and 
other’s  roles when they convene.   
 
The data from the subsequent analysis has been generated from direct observation and 
recordings of the MMG meeting. The selection of episodes was in beforehand specified by a 
number of criteria which were outlined based on the theoretical framework to locate and 
analyze discursive closures and openings, and the material has been codified to ensure 
confidentiality. An additional criteria was established once the meeting had been carried out, 
allowing for an abductive approach to the data generation and subsequent analysis. This will 
be explained in further detail below.  
Direct observation 
My function in the meeting was non-participatory from the perspective that I did not formally 
participate in the meeting. I did however act reactively through direct observation, meaning 
that I was explicit in my role as an observer of their actions and did not pretend otherwise. 
Accordingly, I chose to inform the participants that they could stop the recording devises at 
any time in order to grant them control of the observation, thereby making the situation more 
comfortable and natural. Still, my presence and recording devices have had some degree of 
influence in the way communication has been carried out and thus has had some analytical 
and methodological implications such as the “audience dilemma” (Bernard 2006 pp. 413, 
425). For example, when presenting my intentions for the study, I was open about what to say 
and what not in order to not excessively impose on their proceeding dialogues. I have had the 
ambition to explicate this and other assumptions throughout the presented material and the 
arguments derived from it in order to offer the reader transparency between what has 
appeared as written text and my preconceptions, as well as my experience gained from 
attending the meeting. 
From observation to transcription 
The meeting was recorded in order to obtain the chronology of actions that were considered 
relevant for the establishment of decisions throughout the meetings, and more importantly, to 
explore the opportunities for micro practices that occurred throughout the process. In terms of 
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confidentiality, any reference except for the region in which the material was gathered has 
been codified (Kvale and Brinkman 2009).  
 
The meeting was held in Swedish and has been transcribed accordingly, whereas the 
presented episodes have been translated into English and the majority of the subsequent 
analysis is based on this translation. The transcribed material was interpreted through the 
concepts of discursive closures and openings which construct the basis for identifying the 
character of the communication taking place. Deceitful characteristics (referring to self 
dilution leading to false consensus mentioned earlier) imply a critical analysis of the empirical 
material. A hermeneutical approach towards interpretation has thus been utilized in 
combination with a rational reconstruction of meanings in relation to different contexts with 
respect to a critical reflexive thinking in order to make it adequately justified according to my 
own sense of rational reasoning (Habermas 1990) and consequently abductive inferences. My 
ambition has been to apply rational reconstruction as a methodological attitude towards my 
interpretation and understanding of observable events and simultaneously search for 
explanations of deeper meanings (Pedersen 2008). This level of reasoning has inter alia 
resulted in how the material has been structured (see below), enabling for a level of 
reconstruction through different contexts, generating a thematic fundament for different 
interpretations of meanings.  
Criteria for transcribing 
The following criteria for selection of episodes have been used insofar as it constituted an 
interaction between at least two members and their claims offered to the interaction contained 
indications of relevance to SMM. The selected episodes all contain the first three criteria 
while the fourth has served to specify an additional selection. Accordingly, episodes were 
selected according to; (1) when members provided claims of knowledge, values or interests to 
the interaction (2) when there were disagreements about issues or meanings (if there is no 
disagreement, then the actors can be assumed to maintain background consensus), (3) when 
there was a sequence of meaning exchanges leading to a decision or a decision of a decision, 
(4) when members explicitly refer to uncertainty (the idea of impossibility of complete 
knowledge) in response to a validity claim.  
 
The three criteria have been developed based on the theoretical framework offered by Deetz 
in terms of locating micro practices described earlier. The fourth criterion regarding 
uncertainty has been abductively developed in part from the material that emerged from the 
meeting. This criterion was one which was realized when it empirically appeared as potential 
source for discursive closures as the meeting progressed in combination with my pre-
conceived theoretical framework and by reviewing the AM literature. To realize such an 
approach, the first step has been to select larger sections for transcriptions based on the first 
three criteria, followed by a more careful interpretation by means of the fourth criteria. This 
implies a moving back and forth between more narrowly selected sections and larger ones 
enabling to perceive the pre-established criteria through different contexts, albeit still 
affiliated to ‘the general of closures and openings’ as it were. Through these criteria, closures 
apply to moments, above all, characterized by disagreements, but might also apply to claims 
of uncertainties and also be revealed throughout the context of the accomplishment of a 
decision. The fourth criteria, in particular, has revealed ways to analyze the theoretical 
framework in more specific terms in relation to AM as a concept and the case at hand, which 
arguably makes it a valuable contribution to knowledge.  
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When searching for any of the eight types of closures, I have been searching for, to take 
neutralization as an example, moments when actors make seemingly objective claims by 
which assumptions appear hidden in making assertions such as: “The data show that calf-
weights have been reduced and this is because the quality and quantity of food (trees) have 
rapidly deteriorated which is why we need to lower the moose stock, and you cannot argue 
with the data right in front of you”. In this fictitious example, it appears unquestioned that the 
data (“A”) is correct which accentuate the following assertion: “A” is true, therefore my 
(interpretative) statement “B” is also true and so the only solution is “C”, which is why you 
cannot question the validity of “B” and “C”. Conversely, when there is a claim indicating a 
closure of exploring the validity of what has been “naturalized” still becomes subject to 
questioning, it can be viewed as a function to meta-communicate about the closure and can 
thus be regarded as an opening.  Additionally, when searching for openings, I have been 
locating moments when the members of the group appear to accomplish a commitment to 
engage in understanding that appears beneficial for all interacting participants. Such co-
constructed spaces to engage in discourses have been interpreted to be characterized by a 
genuine intersubjective experience that is guided towards generating a rationally achieved 
consensus on differences in knowledge and experience. 
Conversation Analysis 
As part of analytical discourse research, there are several schools of discourse analysis which 
Conversation Analysis is part of (Cromdal (2009)). Conversation analysis criticizes that pre-
conceived theoretical frameworks narrows the embedded opportunities for interpretation 
(Cromdal 2009; Llewellyn and Hindmarsch 2011). However, such criticism can arguably be 
reduced, I believe, through means of abductive reasoning and inference as ways of generating 
transparency between empirical data to analysis and conclusions (see below). What I have 
borrowed from conversation analysis is ‘turn taking’, a system of order that people use to 
make sense of their own and others acts. Thus, the assumption is that people interact through 
such a system, where the consequence of such turn takings between people is acts of 
understandings through a mutual production of meanings (Cromdal 2009). When accentuating 
the sense-making on behalf of the participants, one needs to demonstrate what they perceive 
to be relevant during the interaction and what the effects are (ibid.) However, what is relevant 
and hence what the effect might be can be vastly interpreted and conversation analysts seek to 
describe what the participants themselves find relevant (ibid.). It is at this point that my own 
choice of methodology disunites with conversation analysis in that I interpret the analysis 
produced by the participants in terms of what is relevant in relation to my theoretical selection 
and accompanied assumptions. This means that I narrow the range of possibilities to 
investigate potentially relevant aspects of the generated data, particularly from the initial stage 
as criteria for selection of episodes, have been established mainly through a pre-conceived 
theoretical framework. Hence, the sense-making that is produced throughout the discourse is 
measured against a normative template that is communicative rationality, to highlight aspects 
that can or should be improved according to the normative realization of AM. Accordingly, 
the relevance participants ascribe to the interaction and the effects it has deliberately 
differentiates from what is presented in the researcher’s analysis, which essentially is the 
whole point: to bring out the aspects that could be of relevance to the participants. It becomes 
a matter of describing how participants covertly (or if you will, practically) display their 
meaning-making in relation to the theoretical framework. The interplay that occurs between 
participants is the product of how participants indicate to one another the direction of the 
conversation which they moment by moment co-construct through turn takings (ibid.). This 
moment by moment display of intersubjective understanding is that which can manifest in 
discursive closures or openings. Such manifestations can be seen as active accomplishments 
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through the medium of discourse which creates the platform for discussions and decision 
makings in question (Llewellyn and Hindmarsch 2011). A discourse is not closed until it has 
become confirmed as one and it intimately depends on the preceding and ensuing interplay, 
that is, a discourse has to emerge before it can be closed. What this means is that, as goes for 
the relevance of the analysis in this study, openings and closures need be explored through a 
sequential order, rather than solitary individual contributions. Finally, the analysis of situated 
activities (ongoing interaction) ideally shapes the analysis in a present mode rather than as an 
antecedent in order not to close theoretical inferences prematurely (cf. ibid. p. 13) This, I 
argue, refers to ways of abductive inference which alleviates the pressure between explaining 
phenomena through theory and/or empirical material which is why I have chosen to present 
the material through sequences. 
Hermeneutics and Abduction 
My principal methodological strategy and much of my meta-theoretical assumptions are 
grounded in hermeneutics. Through this meta-theoretical application I recognize that I myself 
operate under theory laden-language (Pedersen 2008) as well as empirically-laden theory 
(Alvesson and Sköldberg 2009) as part of my pre-understanding. Habermas’ theory on 
communicative action, as a critical standard to measure degrees of distortions, as well as the 
fine tuning of this measurement apparatus through Deetzs’ micro-practices of discursive 
closures and conversely openings, have constituted my primary framework for analysis. 
Furthermore, the process of data generation and analysis has been abductively pursued in that 
my understanding has been (re)shaped, moving not only hermeneutically between pre-
understanding-understanding and part-whole, but also between the pre-established theoretical 
framework and the generated empirical material, allowing for surprises to alter my 
preconceptions. Although there are different views on the meaning of abduction (McKaughan 
2008), the method in any case points to a process of tuning ones interpretative framework as 
empirical material accumulates, and serves to inspire understanding of the subject matter 
which therefore differentiates from induction and deduction (Alvesson and Sköldberg 2009). 
Accordingly, the empirical material has been analyzed in light of theoretical preconceptions, 
along with the attitude that discrepancies (or surprises) have served as incentives to 
reflexively reconsider such preconceived constructs. Equally important has been to consider 
the parallel which implies that the methods used to gather material should become revised if 
the preconceptions can be rationally motivated. Seen in this manner, abduction implies a 
hermeneutic approach which alternates, and therefore aims to alleviate tensions between 
preconceived theoretical claims and empirically obtained material (Alvesson and Sköldberg 
2009). Accordingly, the material selected for analysis through a description of ‘moment-by-
moment’ accomplishments in combination with related thematic contents has served to 
abductively and hermeneutically explore the substance of the meeting taking place, while 
hopefully also enabling for the reader to arrive at similar conclusions or rationally motivated 
differences.  Thus, in referring to abduction and hermeneutics, the aim has been to keep track 
of my own theoretical development throughout the process of interpretation and remain open 
to alternative theories and techniques as empirical findings emerge. 
Structuring the material 
In demonstrating the occurrence of discursive openings and closures, the moments in which 
they are (co)constructed are given through sequences that display the interactions (speech 
acts) as they appeared in the factual meetings. In order to depict the context characterizing 
each sequence, the precedent interactive orientations are offered in the form of a summary, or 
preamble if you will. As Moberg (2010) notes; “speech acts are always produced in relation to 
contexts” in order to make it intelligible (Moberg 2010 p. 197, author’s translation).  
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Different topics arising through the meetings are distinguished by episodes. An episode is 
accordingly established with respect to the established criteria mentioned above. These 
criteria consequently delimit situations when an item is raised relevant to the agenda, until it 
is jointly ended and is replaced by a new item. An episode may thus contain several closures 
respective openings as well as different contexts, still affiliated to the same item on the 
agenda. Each discursive closure, opening and context builds upon one another throughout an 
episode, and this relationship yields deeper insight (meanings) behind each sequence and 
accordingly constitutes a theme of the current interaction, which in turn provides clues to 
antecedent episodes, and indeed, hopefully the general character of the meetings. Episodes are 
numbered in the order by which they appear, such as “episode 1” equals “E1” followed by the 
number proceeding from the initial speech act made by a participant “within” the episode, 
such as “01”. Consequently, an episode may have begun by a participant making an assertion, 
thus denoted as “E101”. However, the statements featuring an example of a closure displayed 
as a sequence may appear later in the episode whereas several speech acts may have occurred 
prior to the sequence. Accordingly, a sequence may begin at “E155” whereas previous speech 
acts are summarized as a preamble. 
 
The members of the group are denoted as “M” (1-6), the chairman being “M1” whereas M2-
M6 represents only different members, not their positions as representatives. As was 
mentioned in the introduction, the MMG consists of three hunting and three landowner 
representatives.  However, it is also significant to note that all landowner representatives are 
also hunters, which I therefore assume to blur the border between these two interests. 
Accordingly as far as the scope of this study goes, there is no need to emphasize the structural 
capacity represented by each member, anything other than how such capacity or interests may 
appear through discourses.  
 
All text has been transcribed in a standardized writing form. This means that the interaction 
has been transcribed normatively (formal language) in contrast to how it has been pronounced 
(e.g. ‘you are’ instead of ‘you’re’) through the more formal normative written language (ibid.) 
in order to make the written language consistent, and also for the purpose of a more secure 
translation from Swedish to English.  Paralinguistic phenomena such as tone of voice have not 
been included as I do not assume it to serve an actual function of the theoretical criteria. 
Finally, brackets are used in order to make the translation between Swedish to English 
grammatically correct as well as to clarify items which the members are referring to when 
something that is said has been intersubjectively established prior to the offered sequence. 
Empirical data & analysis  
The structure of the meeting 
The meeting lasted for approximately three hours and was held at one of the member’s 
homes, and they circulate the location for the meetings evenly between their residents. Prior 
to the meeting itself, I had cleared up with the chairman my reasons for recording and my 
ethical obligations towards the members of the group. I was, however, asked to repeat these 
whereas they mutually gave clearance for me to use these devises. I used three recording 
devices in order to secure the audio uptake.  
 
In declaring the meeting opened, the chairman (M1) presented the agenda beginning with 
reviewing of this year’s moose hunt, review of data received by the county administration 
board, and finally to discuss the moose management plan. At this point, it is worthwhile in 
pointing out that M1 proposed that they would postpone the decision making since one of the 
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members (M6) was not present due to misinformation. After presenting the agenda, M1 
proceeded by asking if there were any other points or concerns to be brought up. No such 
requests were made. The talk during the first half of the meeting consisted of going through 
data received from the MMUs. The second half resulted in a decision making procedure. 
Episode 1  
In previous discussions thus far throughout this meeting, there have been concerns raised 
about the legitimacy of data reported from the MMUs regarding inventories such as moose 
observations and droppings used to estimate the number of moose. Accordingly, the truth of 
the data has been questioned, mainly by M5, and a few openings have emerged to investigate 
the rationale behind M5s claim. 
 
Subsequently, M1 encourages the members to view a density map of the moose (which is 
established by data from the above mentioned inventories) within the MMA. Using this map 
as a base of reference, M5 contends on three subsequent occasions that the number of moose 
are misleading, finally says pointing to the map: (E145): But as you can see [in this location], 
here I can guarantee that this is likely to be the [lowest populated] area [of moose] in the 
entire region, and upwards [as you can see, M3] there are less points [representing moose]. 
This is why it is incorrect. Accordingly, M5 is saying that areas that have low number of 
points actually should have higher and vice versa thereby disputing the data in terms of truth. 
M3 responds saying that (E146): Well, one can discuss that as much as one wants […] 
however, now it is a local discussion, whereby M5 (E147) responds: Yes. It is, thus 
confirming M3s assertion. 
 
M3s response (E146) is a questioning of the relevance and truth behind M5s assertion (E145), 
and by indirectly contending that M5s assertion can be discussed infinitely without settling on 
an agreement, M3s response is a simultaneous expression of that it is a matter of opinion, and 
as such is not established on a rational ground. Accordingly, the knowledge presented by M5 
has been subjectified through M3s response, which is further reinforced by questioning the 
relevance referring to that it is ‘a local discussion’. By agreeing to M3s response, M5 has 
confirmed the closure initiated by M3. After which, all members continue exploring the data 
of the density map, and M5 continues asserting that the data is incorrect but the underlying 
reasons as to why s/he contends this is never explored, rather M3 assumes statistical 
constructs (trends, confidence interval etc.) to disclaim M5 knowledge representation without 
actually investigating the intelligibility, truth, relevance or sincerity behind it. 
Episode 2 
The present topic concerns forest and crop damages and evidently, the MMUs have reported 
that they find the damages tolerable. M3 has contended the reason for this in that the MMUs 
‘do not view it as a commercial forest’, thereby questioning the truth and relevance behind 
these reports by implying that the MMUs would not find the damages tolerable if they had a 
commercial interest in the forest. However, this view is never explored by the other members 
but instead the discussion is continued regarding whether the damages should be conceived by 
the MMG as tolerable or not. The members are now trying to assess whether the information 
concerns old or new damages on trees. At this point, M3 stresses that what is of relevance to 
the present conversation is new damages on trees and s/he raises a view from an actor “Börje” 
at the National Board of Forestry, asserting that this actor has claimed on behalf of the forest 
companies that they only tolerate a certain percentage, by which M3 indicates that these 
companies (according to “Börje”) tolerate less than what is stated on the MMU plans. 
Subsequently, M1 suggestively concludes that their assessment as part of the MMA plan 
would serve more as an indication rather than a formal request to reduce the number of 
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moose. S/he thereby proposes a guarded foresight in meeting the proposed consideration of 
the forest companies. However, M3 appears unsatisfied with M1s asserted reaction to her/his 
previous contention which appears in the following sequence: 
 
M3 (E201): But if “Börje” [from the National Board of Forestry] says that he thinks that 
there is too much damage in relation to the moose stock we have, then it is him who has the 
knowledge in any case. 
M5 (E202): He is an ordinary person. 
M3 (E203): Well, yes. 
M2 (E204): He is essentially a civil (private) person as well. 
M5 (E207): It is impossible to trust one or two old men. That does not work. 
M2 (E208): Not because of that, but rather… 
M3 (E209): It appears that we have to research more deeply. We will not complete this plan 
today in any case. We should look more into it.  
M2 (E210): But then… We will not have any more facts next time either. 
M3 (E211): Yes well, there is nothing more to it than to contact people who can say what 
these numbers actually mean. 
M4 (E212): How to interpret them. 
 
M3s reference (E201) to an ‘expert’ has been constructed as operating by an intelligible 
standard that is beyond the members and hence their capacity to rationally engage in further 
scrutinizing and question the validity of such a claim. Accordingly, previous claims by the 
members, and indeed the represented ‘fact’ that the MMUs regard damages as tolerable have 
been reassessed as invalid by ways of disqualification. However, as this act of disqualification 
becomes challenged, the closure is not confirmed but instead meta-communicated about. 
“Börjes” presumed knowledge becomes questioned in terms of truth when M5 trivializes 
(E202) “Börjes” knowledge asserting that: “he is an ordinary person.” It is here indicated that 
the knowledge represented thus far throughout the discourse should continue to be evaluated 
which is also mutually reciprocated (E204) by M2. This meta-communicative maneuver has 
thus functioned as an opening of a closure by invalidating the disqualification of previous 
reasoning.  
 
Following M2, M5 explicitly questions (E207) the sincerity and/or truth on behalf of “Börje” 
and hence the truth behind M3s assertion, whereas M2 appears to elaborate (E208) on her/his 
previous assertion, indicating that s/he does not question the legitimacy of “Börje” as a 
person, but rather the truth behind the knowledge represented on his behalf and plausibly the 
relevance (normative rightness) of the assertion to incorporate this representation into the 
discourse.  
 
“Börjes” knowledge is not justified nor further asserted through validating the perspective. 
M3 rather reorients (E209) the truth behind the knowledge presented by asserting that it is 
incomplete and needs to be explored externally, that is, from outside the intersubjectively 
established representation of knowledge currently located within the present interaction. M3 
justifies (E209) this claim by appealing to the lack of capacity, and thus uncertainty of the 
knowledge representations involved, and therefore invites the other members to delay the 
completion of the plan. Through this assertion, there is an indication to close the validation of 
“Börjes” knowledge as well as the exploration surrounding the perspectives of the members, 
whilst opening an alternative discourse about researching the matter ‘more deeply’.  
Accordingly, the closure is indicative towards disqualifying the present discourse in terms of 
truth and relevance, or possibly indicating a level of established uncertainty surrounding the 
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meanings of the data (hence intelligibility) not to pursue validation of claims in the present 
discourse. However, M2 subsequently asserts (E210) that there will always be uncertainties 
and thereby s/he questions the relevance behind M3s claim, and consequently the assertion 
points towards continuing the validation of the previous discourse and simultaneously deny 
the matter of ‘looking more into it’ (E209). In this way, uncertainty regarding incomplete 
knowledge has been constructed as both a means to discursively close, as well as means to 
meta-communicatively prevent the closure, and hence redeem the intersubjective experience, 
by reference to claims of uncertainty, which has arisen throughout this episode. 
 
M3s response (E211) then, recapitulates her/his, to the sequence offered here, initial assertion 
(E201), which suggests that the discourse regarding the investigation of the issue at a later 
point in time still applies and, therefore remains open whereas the investigation of the 
knowledge among the participants has ceased. The discourse has been closed accordingly 
through a disqualified feature, which further emerges in the upcoming sequence. M3s 
assertion (E211) is then affirmed (E212) by M4, and the discussion subsequently ensues in 
this direction.  
 
They soon arrive at the conclusion that the inventory assessments needs to be discussed with a 
third party from the Swedish Nature Management and they jointly affirm that furthermore, it 
should be done by more than one of the MMA members. Additionally, M3 interjects saying 
that (E243): …the landowner side [should be contacted as well] so it is not just you who are 
the wiser when we convene again. This final display shows that there is a perceived risk of a 
meta-representation of knowledge acquired from a future interaction with an external party 
runs a risk of being distorted if not confirmed by more than one of the members in the present 
interaction. Accordingly, this distortion stands a greater chance of being discursively 
redeemed if considered sincere through multiple representations of the same source. This 
indicates that claims to sincerity and truth of the conveyed knowledge throughout this episode 
remains largely invalidated. Accordingly, there is an emergent display of doubt that future 
acquired information may be one-sided. 
Episode 3  
In this episode, the agenda concerns the goals for the development of the moose stock within 
the MMA. The members are to decide whether the stock should increase, remain unchanged, 
or decrease. They move on to goals for the stock size during winter, and it is suggested that 
the goal set from previous year has been fulfilled, and that the moose stock indeed has 
declined, however there are disagreements as to what extent. The members are now exploring 
what the future development of the stock should be and the theme for this subsequent 
sequence is the representation of other stakeholder’s opinions, and thus a discussion 
surrounding democratic ideals. 
 
M5 (E317): I think so as well [that we have succeeded in our goal of reducing the moose 
stock]. I had a meeting with [one of the] MMUs and they are all saying they do not want 
under 12 [moose per 1000 ha]. The administrative board [in one] of the game unit divisions 
said that [no less than] 12-14, otherwise it is not worth while, hunting moose. I do not fully 
agree with them about that, but so be it. 
M3 (E318): Well, that’s the game unit division. 
M5 (E319): Yes sure, [but] everyone should naturally have a say. But it’s the MMUs that will 
decide on this in the end. [It is their plans] to which we will have to adjust. 
M2 (E320): Yes, but we are making a good [plan/assessment] here presently. We who… 
M3 (E321): [Our plan] is supposed to be something that the MMUs are expected to take into 
account when they are establishing their plans. It should be like guidelines for them. We are 
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[equally] supposed to take some consideration of the guidelines from the Game Management 
Delegation when we are forming our plan. 
 
In the beginning of the sequence, M5 supposedly represents (E317) the core values of a 
particular MMU as well as of the game unit division administrative board (a division within 
the Hunters Association) regarding number of moose in relation to corresponding hunting 
ideals, whereas s/he asserts her/his own perspective opposing this whilst displaying a level of 
acceptance with regards of the represented view of the MMU and the delegation. M3s 
response (E318) can be read as: ‘that is their view’, signaling that the perspective should not 
be explored, as such a claim is based on personal values which therefore qualify as a 
discursive closure by means of subjectification of experience. Perhaps ambiguously argued, it 
could also be seen as a maneuver to disqualify the perspective from the discourse if read as: 
‘they should not influence how we, the MMG, assess the situation’. Based on the continuing 
interpretations by M5 and M2, the latter type of closure appears more likely.  M3 hence 
questions M5s claim in terms of its relevance, truth and sincerity. Subsequently, M5 justifies 
(E319) her/his perspective appealing to a normative standard in that everyone’s opinion is 
relevant, and additionally asserts the relevance of the MMUs opinion claiming that it is their 
choice regardless the MMAs opinion. In so doing, M5 has confirmed the closure but at the 
same time appears to meta-communicate the closure which now functions as an opening of a 
discourse concerning the relevance of including ‘everyone’s opinions’. It follows from M3 
that s/he again questions (E321) the relevance behind M5s justification claiming the MMUs 
are in fact supposed to follow the guidelines established by the MMA, just as the MMA is 
supposed to follow the guidelines from the Delegation. M3 thereby denies the relevance of 
M5s claim appealing to the structural conditions in which management supposedly is located 
and by referring the question of relevance to their own group (the MMG). Cunningly (albeit 
tacitly) enough, in referring to that the MMGs opinions should be regarded by the Delegation 
by the same token as the (more local) game unit division’s opinion should be regarded by the 
MMG, M3s assertion appears to function as a meta-communicative closure, indicative of 
subjectifying M5s claim representing the claims of the game unit division. The closure has 
thus functioned on two levels of interaction.  
Episode 4 
In this particular episode, the discourse still concerns what is tolerable of forest damages and 
what is not, which also much characterized the topic covered in episode 2, indicative of that it 
previously has been inadequately investigated. 
 
The discussion prior to the sequence below has continued surrounding the different guidelines 
by the Game Management Delegation and presently settles on one in particular, cited by M3 
(E400): And then, the moose stock should be in balance so that damages on forest and 
agriculture can be kept on an acceptable level. 
M5 (E401): Yes, but if you look at the MMUs, most of them tolerate [this]. 
M3 (E402): Yes most, but not everyone in any case tolerates this. And then, when they also 
almost always accept damages on leaves, then it is a bit strange. Because the leaf is… We 
speak a lot of pine and spruce, but we also get pretty well pay for the birch pulpwood.  
M4 (E403): That’s the most valuable. 
M3 (E404): We get even better pay for this one than spruce now, right!? And then we also 
have [the issue] with preventing moose-related traffic accidents, which we have not succeeded 
with. 
M5 (E405): No, but there is really not much we can do about that, because then we need to 
get rid of the moose [altogether].  
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M3 (E406): Of course we can do something about it. A reduced moose stock affects that you 
will have fewer accidents. 
M5 (E407): Yes but, if there is a game fence along the route where there are accidents, then 
we have no problem.  
 
M5 recapitulates (E401) from earlier discussions (see episode 2) that most of the MMUs 
regard damages as acceptable. Previously, M3s perspective concerning this has only been 
narrowly investigated by which s/he asserted validity to her/his claim whilst simultaneously 
closing the discourse referring to an external source of knowledge (“Börje” – see E201). 
Previous contention by M3 in episode 2 was that ‘[The MMUs] do not view it as a 
commercial forest’, whereas now the argument (E402) has been put in a slightly different 
context in that M3 appears to find it curious as to why so many of the MMUs find such a 
financial loss acceptable. Hence, by citing the guidelines from the Delegation, M3 appears to 
open up for new ways to reinvestigate previously covered topics, which is indicative that 
previous claims need be subjected to further validation in order to legitimize perspectives that 
have not been perceived as fully reciprocated. M4 concurs (E403) with M3s assertion, thereby 
confirming an opening for the discourse to continue in this direction. M3 then supplements 
(E404) the contention with moose-related traffic accidents by which s/he reorients the 
relevance, truth, intelligibility and sincerity behind her/his contention by placing it in a 
different context which supposedly can be confirmed by the other members of the group as a 
conceivable rationale to reduce the moose stock. However, the perspective introduced by M3 
is diverted by M5 who redirects (E405) the issue as a fruitless commitment, which it is 
beyond their capacity to resolve. Accordingly, M5 questions the relevance behind M3s 
assertion by pacifying the issue, thereby indicative of a potential closure of the discourse. M3 
then meta-communicates (E406) the closure, by challenging M5s claim in terms of truth and 
relevance which functions to reopen the discourse by proposing a direct solution, i.e. to 
reduce the moose stock. Yet another solution becomes introduced (E407) by M5, namely 
game fences. In doing this, M3 has, however momentarily, reopened the discourse (as it 
became confirmed (E407) by M5), whereas M5 questions the truth behind M3 suggested 
solution by proposing another one without questioning the intelligibility behind M3s 
interpretation of the situation. 
Episode 5  
In this episode the members are now moving towards establishing a decision on the size of the 
moose stock. This decision is partly based on foregoing assessments throughout the meeting 
and thus carries topical resemblance to precedent episodes. It should be mentioned that in the 
beginning of the meeting they affirmed that they would not make any decisions as of this time 
since one of the members was absent. However, this perception changed throughout the 
meeting and they mutually agreed that a decision should be made at this moment. I can only 
at this point hypothesize that the various perspective and representations of knowledge that 
has emerged throughout the meeting have been recognized, albeit narrowly explored in terms 
intelligibility and truth, which might be perceived as a sufficient foundation on which it is 
assumed that the decision will in any case be made on a majority vote. This reasoning will 
become clearer as we explore the following episodes. 
 
M2 (E505): But seriously, do you really want 10 [moose per 1000 ha]? 
M3 (E506): I think it would be valuable for the [moose] stock to become smaller. I definitely 
believe so. I doubt that there are as much as 14 on average in the whole area, but it could 
surely be 13 in any case I believe.  
M2 (E507): It would be an awful large reduction, that is, to decrease [the stock] from 13 to 
10. 
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M3 (E508): Is it really such a substantial reduction? 
M2 (E509): Yes, it is. 
M3 (E510): But if we are to… I think that we need this if we are to get any results on 
reproduction, calf weights and grazing damages. And additionally, we also had “Börje”. He 
argued that regarding the new damages we have [on trees] according to this survey, that one 
could not exceed 10 in winter stock. He is supposed to be an expert in any case. 
 
Suggested by the word ‘seriously’, M2 questions (E505) the intelligibility and sincerity of the 
reasoning that lies beneath the assertion that the moose stock should be reduced down to a 
number of 10. M3 justifies (E506) her/his contention that it is with regard to the moose stock 
itself (here emphasizing biological diversity and overall health of the stock, and not damages 
on forest that characterized much of M3s previous assertions) that it needs to be reduced. 
Subsequently, M2 questions (E507) the truth when emphasizing the magnitude of change that 
M3 is proposing, whereas s/he reciprocates (E508) by questioning the truth of M2s assertion. 
M3 then offers (E510) an interpretation that such a low number is that which will generate the 
result they strive for, hence asserting the truth and an interpretation of the intelligibility of 
her/his proposition. When additionally supplementing with the external perspective, which 
also emerged in episode 2 (see E201), the assertion has been constructed to function as a 
closure of the validation behind the intelligibility, truth, relevance and sincerity of the claim 
as to why the stock should be reduced by means of disqualifying any knowledge and 
experience previously offered through contrarious claims made by other members, much in 
the same way as it did earlier in the meeting. However, in anticipating reciprocation, M3s 
assertion is met by a silence which signifies either that a closure is in effect or that the 
investigation has become “saturated”, that is, a mutual recognition by the other members that 
a discourse concerning “Börje” is irrelevant to pursue as it has been mutually established 
earlier in the meeting that they in fact would consult other sources of knowledge 
representations (see the discussion surrounding E243). Furthermore, the character of M3s 
assertion is constructed in a way that implies naturalization since it is treated through M3s 
representation of this ‘expert knowledge’ as something that has remained unquestioned and is 
therefore constructed as a ‘fact’ through the present assertion: as an emergent property, 
naturalized as part of the discourse, as it were. This construction of expert knowledge hence 
reappeared despite earlier assertions by the other members questioning the validity of this 
claim in that “Börje” became constructed as ‘an ordinary person’ (see E202). 
 
M5 (E511): (Uh-Huh) 
M3 (E512): Then there’s the issue of actually getting the hunting parties to join in on 
shooting off as much [moose]. That will be considerably more difficult. 
M5 (E513): It does not work. That is why I think it is foolish to interfere [on this point] 
because it will be just to irritate. If we take too drastic measures, we will have it against us 
instead and then we will not have it easy. 
M4 (E514): 11-12 then? Instead of 12-13? 
M1 (E515): Or we set 12. I can agree with M5 that one should move carefully in order not to 
make people irritated. 
M5 (E516): So it comes from the bottom, because it will happen. 
M2 (E517): But I could also agree that one perhaps should reduce the stock and see what the 
effect might be. But [reducing down] to 10 is so incredibly drastic, and if [in fact a wolf 
territory was to be established] then it would go [down] really fast.  
 
In lack of a response, M3 raises (E512) a topic related to the discourse concerning the actual 
implementation of her/his assertion. Implicitly, it appears from M3s contention that the 
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hunting parties will oppose M3s proposition, thereby questioning an anticipated response 
from a third party in terms of truth, relevance and sincerity. This anticipation is partly 
confirmed (E513) by M5 but at the same time s/he redirects the significance of M3s assertion 
as something that is futile, followed by a prediction that emphasizes the magnitude of such an 
exercise. Instead of exploring M3s perspective which indicates that ‘getting hunting parties to 
join’ is difficult albeit implying not impossible, M5s response could hence function to pacify 
M3s assertion by diverting it as impossible and therefore futile to investigate further. 
Following M5, by proposing (E514) a compromise, the closure has been affirmed by M4 as 
s/he did not engage in M3s previous assertion by, for example, questioning M3 what 
possibilities there might be. Additionally, by directly offering a number that appears to lie in 
between M3s and M4s different positions, M4 indirectly meta-communicates the previous 
two closures by offering a summarized interpretation of the different positions represented 
prior to the closures. This is confirmed by M1s compromise (E515) supplied by repeating 
M5s justification; that it will avoid antagonism. M5 mutually reciprocates (E516) and adds 
yet another interpretation of the given assertion, thereby offering a justification by contending 
that M3s perspective is not disregarded since ‘…it will happen’, that is; the moose stock will 
eventually decline. Again, M3s assertion has been pacified. It could also be interpreted as 
M5s assertion (E516) working as meaning denial in that it implies both that M5 has 
previously argued against such a reduction whilst now ostensibly agreeing that such a 
reduction is warranted and will be eventually be realized, thereby bringing about confusion of 
what s/he actually signifies. M2 then, while in part affirming (E517) M3s assertion, s/he 
attests a perceived uncertainty to M3s claim (‘… [to] see what the effect might be’), and 
thereby not only questions the proposed truth, but also affirms this by contending to 
uncertainty relative to the ‘drastic’ reduction proposed by M3.  
Episode 6 
During this last episode of the meeting when a decision is to be made, the type of claims or 
reasoning that previously characterized the discussion (e.g. E517), which ensued by pacifying 
M3s contention initiated by M5 (see E513) also characterizes the present interaction. The 
other members thus continue in this manner displayed in the following sequence: 
  
M2 (E608): We will reduce [the stock] in the long term. 
M1 (E609): I think I agree. I sort of think that we may have to look at this in a longer time 
span. That we go with 12 now and look at it in the long run, and then we will continue to 
evaluate year by year. 
M2 (E610): Yes, and we might [stand a greater chance] of getting approval from everyone at 
once. 
 
Before M2s assertion (E608), M1 asked the question if the decision should be voted upon 
whereas M3 contended that (E606): I have a hard time [accepting 12 moose per 1000 ha], but 
I will have this voted against me, right!? And I do not know if a member can actually make a 
reservation. The other members have in this sequence, without assuming a response to M3s 
assertion (E606), appealed to uncertainty by a ‘wait and see’ outlook by which they seemingly 
are engaging in M3s point of view but at the same time pacifying the issue by indicating that 
things will eventually change in the direction M3 advocates. Again, as initially emerged in 
episode 5 (see E516), this could also be interpreted as meaning denial whereby the closure is 
reinforced by induce confusion of what is warranted or a legitimate reduction of moose.  
Briefly after M2s affirmative assertion (E610), M3 appears to negotiate when saying (E616): 
But you had a proposal for 11-12 as well, then we would make a bit larger step. The assertion 
is followed by M1 summarizing the two alternatives (11-12 and 12). M3 then explores the 
matter by implicitly signaling to M4 and M2 when arguing that (E620): Yes, but I have to get 
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M4 and M2 in on it in any case, since we don’t have M6 here. Even if you [M1] as chairman 
can [decide]. M3 appears to invite (E620) M4 and M2 by engaging them in the proposal ‘11-
12’ and at the same time explicate that M1 will decisively vote against it since it in the present 
situation requires three out of five votes to overrule the chairman. However, now M1 and M3 
begin to discuss that such a type of voting would not be good for the group, indicating that 
future decision making processes may succumb to conflicts and possibly hamper future 
decisions, or perhaps disjoin the group altogether. In bringing the issue of voting and the unity 
of the group into the discourse, M3 together with M1 has constructed an opening to continue 
the discussion of the number of moose that should be reduced whereby the group devotes a 
moment of re-investigating the droppings inventory until M2 asserts that the inventory is 
correct by which M3 states (E625): Yes, however M4 and I [believe] it is perhaps somewhat 
high. M3 (again) questions M2s assertion in terms of truth which is mutually reciprocated by 
M4. M2 then contends that (E627): [if] we manage to reduce the number from 14 to 12, then 
we have achieved something grand. This is a large reduction. M2 does not assert the truth 
(E627) questioned by L3 (E625), but rather avoids or bypasses the matter. S/he asserts the 
number 14 as a true number by which s/he uses the differential down to 12 to emphasize the 
magnitude of reduction, claiming is as ‘something grand’. It appears as if M2 closed the 
investigation by means of naturalization in treating ‘14’ as the correct number. M1 continues 
offering that (E628): We can vote 12 then, unanimously, hence confirming the closure. A 
decision was shortly after made to reduce the stock to 12 moose per 1000 ha, during which 
time M3 argues that (E639): … Well then, I guess I will have to with the rest of you as well. It 
would be a pity to disjoin the group. Indicated by this assertion is that M3 maintains 
opposition to the truth, rightness, sincerity and possibly intelligibility of the decision while 
openly displaying that these claims to validity have not been rationally pursued and are 
therefore not entirely legitimate. The basis for a unanimous decision is justified only based on 
the value of maintaining the cohesiveness of the group.  
Discussion  
Cause and effect of discursive closures and openings 
Throughout the previous section, several discursive closures and openings have been 
identified and their functions on procedural interactions described. It is now becoming in 
turning to what underlying reasons these micro practices have had on the meeting and what 
consequences or effects they have generated with respect to the communicative orientations 
of the meeting, viewed through participatory aspects of AM.   
 
Throughout the meeting, there were obvious discrepancies between perspectives, mainly 
concerning whether the moose stock should be reduced or not, what its current size was, and 
what meaning it should carry relative to established guidelines for the MMA, and how to 
interpret the meanings placed by the MMUs through their plans on the moose and its effects 
on surrounding habitats. 
When openings were introduced and became elaborated upon, intensified discussions ensued 
and occasionally, joint explorations toward making sense of each other’s knowledge and 
experience emerged. During such moments, the members appeared more inclined to ask 
questions which in turn generated answers that contributed to deeper understandings. A 
deeper understanding could be discerned as questions and answers became more elaborate, 
which indicates an exploration of intersubjective experiences that have arisen throughout the 
discourses. During such moments, it can be assumed that the members mutually gained 
knowledge through the sharing of perspectives, values and knowledge.  
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The closures that emerged were of different kinds and had varying effect on the ensuing 
development of understandings that took place. By ‘varying effect’ I refer to the ways a 
discursive closure appeared as a function in terms of amount and type of turn takings before a 
new issue replaced a previous one. In episode 1, a discussion was circulating around a map 
displaying density of moose which was used to assert validity behind opposing claims, and 
more generally to make sense of the situation. The map itself became instrumental as a tool 
for interpretation, i.e. a visualizing aid to orient their knowledge, experience and values 
around. Such a device can operate both to promote closures as well as openings, depending on 
whether it is conceived to position thinking in specific or in general terms, the latter appearing 
more likely to generate openings if encouraging participants to reflect on their interests and 
values (Ångman 2013 p. 417) with respect to their arguments. This was however not the case. 
In locations on the map where the density of moose appeared inconsistent in relation to how 
the members perceived it to be in reality, the validity of claims were but narrowly explored 
even though initiatives were taken to investigate (open) the underlying rationale behind such 
claims. As such, the map became an authorizing element to generate discursive closures 
thereby excluding a search for values, experience and knowledge that may have had been 
relevant to explore, specifically with respect as to how such assessments (the density map in 
this case) were initially generated and how they could be improved. In episode 3, external 
representations were brought into the discourse that were constructed as diverging opinions. 
However, as they appeared explicated as external and divergent, they were conceived as an 
illegitimate part of the discourse. In denying its relevance, such a meta-representative 
divergence was never explored and elaborated upon in terms of potential validity claims. 
Throughout the meeting, such external representations appeared to have functioned either as 
positive or negative elements in the elaboration of discourses and understanding, depending 
on whether it worked to constrict or to expand opportunities to contribute with questions and 
answers throughout the discourse. However, in episode 3, external perspectives concerned 
groups of people, mainly the MMUs, and by (albeit briefly) questioning such views, it became 
a meta-discourse about democratic ideals in the context of SMM-AM, which I perceive as an 
opportunity, or opening, for elaboration of values. In episode 2 and 5, similar mechanisms 
appeared but were framed as ‘expert knowledge’ which functioned, in both episodes, as an 
acquisition of making valid claims without providing much space for such claims to be 
questioned. This bears resemblance to what Arnold, Koro-Ljungberg and Bartels (2012 p. 10) 
suggested based on their findings. Such knowledge surely reflected the values and interest of 
the representative; however, such claims can operate to exclude other interests and 
contributions of knowledge and therefore work as closures (Deetz 1992 p. 189). In these two 
episodes it resulted in something of a feedback loop. In episode 2 the closure was meta-
communicated about, hence opening up for new perspectives to emerge which had been 
intersubjectively established to deny a “re-entrance” of the same closure in episode 5. 
Conceptualized in this manner, the values and interest initiating the closure were not 
investigated while at the same time they worked to end the understandings that were 
generated prior to the closures, whereas the original agenda continued as the original 
discourses never were revisited. Thus, closures generated new closures in a loop-like fashion. 
However in episode 2 the investigation of knowledge prior to its closure was decided to be 
postponed. Accordingly, it cannot be ascertained whether such a closure had a negative effect 
on the members understanding and development of knowledge as they are likely to engage the 
discourse at a later point in time. As such, the closure that appeared in episode 2 was in fact a 
closure at the time, but it could also be seen as an opening for future investigations as 
questions of validity were the explicated reasons for this postponement. It can be assumed that 
the members are likely to engage in the discourse once they have had opportunities to acquire 
understanding of the subject matter from other directions, granted it will later serve to 
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occasion elaboration of validity claims. In the first part of episode 5, however, the 
consequence was that questions pertaining to the member initiating the closure that became 
seized, and the perspective generating these questions in turn became subjected to additional 
closures during the second part of the episode, again operating as a feedback loop for the 
individual introducing the first closure. It appears that this far into the meeting, a procedure 
had been established which excluded further elaboration of perspectives other than that of the 
members own. During the second part of episode 5, as well as in episode 6, the members were 
expressing quite different perspectives in contrast to what they previously had throughout the 
meeting. A discourse became constructed as if all members shared the same interests and 
values in that the moose stock should be significantly reduced, but with the reservation that it 
would be beyond their capacity to implement. Thus, at this point, a majority of the members 
seemed to have asserted their opinions on what a ‘realistic’ goal for the size of the moose 
stock should be. Yet again, discursive closures appeared around externally represented 
perspectives and became constructed as a function to narrow the decision making mandate 
based on the perceived potential responses certain types of decisions would generate. Thus, in 
including fictitious responses by ways of external representations, even though they well 
might have been rationally justified based on the experiences that were used to generate them, 
it was effectively conceived to close the exploration of such rationale through claims of 
validity to justify such responses. Furthermore, what can be revealed, especially with respect 
to episodes 5 and 6, was that the perception of unpredictable responses from reducing the 
moose below a certain point, as well as uncertainties arising from imagined responses by 
other stakeholders such as the MMUs, seemingly appeared to have served as a tool to 
undermine opportunities of engaging in different aspects of issues and hence narrow the 
potential to open up for new perspectives. I believe this requires some elaboration: In 
appealing to something that may or may not happen in a future social or ecological state, the 
discourse becomes more hypothetical. As noted earlier, the normative requirement of AM is 
that uncertainty is embraced, which entails a necessity to take risks which in turn generate 
opportunities to learn. However, it clearly emerged in this meeting that imaginatively playing 
around with the moose stock and relational social arrangements was conceived as carrying too 
great of a risk and the general argument implied that uncertainty of the situation was too high. 
Thus, uncertainty was in and by itself working as a construction towards discursive closures 
allowing for hypothetical scenarios to “pacify” potentially relevant validity claims to be 
elaborated upon. Indeed, as Johnson (1993) argues, uncertainty and risk are more social than 
scientific in nature and this perception appears to have reflected much of the discourses that 
appeared in the meeting. Additionally, the eight micro practices described by Deetz (1992) do 
not cover such an agent for closures which is why I find it a relevant “site-specific” element to 
extrapolate on in terms of what meaning or impact it may have to constrict or expand 
discourses when uncertain knowledge becomes framed as inevitable. Representations of 
uncertainty appeared to have had, in this specific case, a clear constricting function on 
discourses and validity claims. Furthermore, a perceived probability of triggering conflicts 
due to drastic reduction of the moose stock was explicitly conceived as something that should 
be avoided (see for example episode 5, E515).  
 
It has been established earlier in this paper that durable policies are built out from diverse 
perspectives and values, and that legitimate decisions require that conflicts are seen as a 
source for different perspectives to emerge and should therefore be pursued (e.g. Lee 1999).  
In this specific case, it appears as if the sheer prospect of conflicts has been construed as 
something that can stall or even wither implementation of decisions formed by the MMG. As 
the perspectives of various actors and groups, especially the MMUs, has been represented 
throughout the discussions to emphasize such prospects, granted that these representations are 
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somewhat accurate, it is safe to assume that similar perceptions extend outside this particular 
MMG. Provided that with such an argument, potentially relevant knowledge for management 
may lie dormant as long as discussions steadily are steered away from such antagonistic 
outlooks and this should reflect the establishment of new policies. Such examples have been 
given here. It was implicitly indicated in the beginning of episode 2, shortly before the issue 
was closed, when a guarded foresight was expressed concerning a response to the perceived 
needs between the forest companies against that of the MMUs. This reappeared more 
explicitly later on, particularly in episode 5, in which risk of antagonizing especially hunters 
would yield an unrealistic implementation if the decision was to reduce the moose stock 
below a certain limit. The result being that perspectives offering opportunities to investigate 
potentially relevant claims were lost, such as: why it would be unrealistic, why it is perceived 
as an antagonizing agent, and what this ‘lower limit’ of moose would actually mean. If 
questions such as these are not explored, it may well limit opportunities for creative 
reasoning, which is one of the main ingredients that arises from institutional permeability, as 
it has been argued in AM literature (e.g. Gunderson 1999), which stems from an open 
development of understanding (Deetz 1992 p. 188). I do not intend to argue institutional 
inflexibility on behalf of the one meeting I have been analyzing; I have rather argued that this 
particular group appeared as quite informally established and even the setting for the meetings 
are located at their own homes, which I perceived as providing with an informal atmosphere 
for discussion. The point to make is that if conflicts are avoided and hence diverging 
perspectives become systematically excluded from view, then such micro practices will 
produce and reproduce constraints as they become institutionalized, even in informal settings 
such as in the case presented here. Arguably, by deducing the inverse of what Gunderson 
(1999) concluded, we will find a process taking place in which informality grows into 
institutional parameters promoted by discursive closures. This is a reason why opportunities 
for change reside in the ongoing processes of joint explorations of matters and how 
knowledge is intersubjectively managed. Informal relations or key individuals covered in 
previous AM literature do not account for how knowledge is coordinated through acts of 
communicating as actors presently make sense of their situations. Such elements do not 
provide the understanding needed to chart the opportunities for change that presently take 
place. Relations or specific individuals are the result of such a process, jointly co-created by 
the actors involved.  
 
Since the findings in this paper are based on a single case, the scope for transference across 
the wider spectrum of management groups within the SMM arena is too narrow to be 
comprehended on the basis of this study. However, there is enough substance presented 
through this case to evoke incitements for further investigations of how communication is 
shaped throughout SMM. Although several openings to extend viewpoints emerged during 
this meeting, there never appeared any deeper exploration of meanings behind statements. 
Furthermore, as part of my direct observation, I also sensed an underlying tension in that one 
member persistently insisted that the number of moose was too high, that is, the financial 
losses due to damages on trees were too great. This tension was never eased as no direct 
entries were created to engage in a discourse concerning, for example, the value of moose 
versus the value of the forests, and the member who campaigned for the value of the latter 
recurrently returned through different approaches to make rather careful claims, as I perceived 
them, on behalf of forest stakeholders during the meeting. What this entails, from a 
phenomenological viewpoint is that the members seemed to feel quite guarded to express 
what they really wanted to say when discussing agenda covered topics. 
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Throughout the defined episodes, discursive closures appeared during moments when: (1) 
arguments were directly related to ‘facts’ such as a geographical representation serving as a 
visualizing aid, (2) when members invoked a discourse by representing perspectives 
supposedly ‘not belonging to themselves’, (3) when arguments were oriented towards 
uncertainty, and (4) when topics were related to prospects of antagonism or conflicts.  
Conceptualized as themes, they all had in common an element that steered the discussion 
away from the expressions of values that supposedly initiated them, and through discursive 
closures, communicative action was strategically perpetuated as a mechanism which 
functioned to impede rational investigations of knowledge claims. In general, during brief 
moments when differences between perceptions of knowledge became pronounced and 
subject for debate, whereas when contributions of possible relevance for management 
appeared, they were repeatedly and hence systematically closed, denying opportunities for 
learning. Thus, to make use of Deetz’s (1992 p. 192) argument: important moments were 
diverted when talk should in fact begin, not end. In short, contributions of knowledge through 
claims to validity became strategically subverted; contributions which, if elaborated could be 
of significant value for SMM and accordingly, come closer to fulfilling the criteria for AM.  
This raises the question whether the agenda the MMGs make use of to discuss assessments 
and goals for management also should include goals and assessments on how to manage the 
procedures for discussion, that is, how to talk about talk. If MMGs can reach a mutual 
agreement on how to present and acknowledge each other’s perspectives, outcomes may be 
more satisfactory for all members, and we might close in on a platform for communication 
that Lee (1999) advocates, which ideally should engender a procedural format through which 
emergent properties can arise that are mutually perceived as legitimate. In the case presented 
here, the meeting ended with that one member “threatened” with a reservation. If considering 
all speech acts performed by this individual during the meeting, it appeared to be a display of 
dissatisfaction regarding the decision they made, even though everyone finally decided to vote 
unanimously. The meeting ended with unresolved issues as the outcome was not mutually 
accepted, which is indicative that the finalized decision was not thoroughly explored and 
understood. The question is: does the final decision reflect a wider variety of interests and 
values, with due consideration of the underlying process described here and the discursive 
closures that were part of it? The fourth theme mentioned above, was of particular 
significance as it was used as an incentive to rationalize these unresolved issues (See for 
example E513). This in turn raises the question of whether there are ways for this MMG to 
approach antagonism in a more “welcoming manner” instead of diverting arguments in favor 
of group cohesiveness and fear of losing capacity to implement decisions. There is little 
question that this group avoids conflicts rather than to explore and pursue them, and there is a 
clear need to facilitate a legitimate foundation upon which such assumptions and arguments 
can be reinvestigated. If this is a common occurrence among the MMGs, SMM can hardly be 
construed as being adaptive, but this question generates the need for further investigation. 
Conclusion 
I have in this study emphasized participatory aspects of AM through a communicative 
foundation by observing a MMG meeting within the SMM, which has been analyzed through 
discursive openings and closures to ascertain whether or not the formats used for 
communication support the normative criteria needed to qualify management as “adaptive”. 
Discursive closures and openings have proven useful in measuring degrees of systematically 
distorted communication, which as an analytical tool in this particular meeting has shown that 
discursive closures have had considerable impact on the adaptive capacity in terms of a 
systematic exclusion of knowledge, values and perspectives. The members’ contributions 
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appeared to reflect a plurality of relevant insights that were constricted due to the ways they 
jointly characterized the communicative format within which these contributions took place.    
The way members related to, especially, representations of external perspectives, perceived 
consequences of uncertainties and conflicts, contributed to situations when the achievement of 
discursive closures successfully constricted the exploration of differences. This in turn 
narrowed the range of diversity in perspectives, knowledge and values that were expressed; 
factors upon which AM ideally should be exercised. Even though such lost opportunities may 
have been irrelevant or invalid for management, these factors still need be elaborated upon 
before such claims can be rationally established and motivated. Accordingly, if claims to 
validity are not developed in ways that deepen the intersubjective experiences by questioning 
those claims, potentially relevant knowledge goes unexamined and opportunities for learning 
are diminished. And what is more, as it is assumed that discursive closures are practices that 
operate to avoid or suppress conflicts, the applied communicative format that nurtures such 
practices to take place will make it difficult for participants to investigate root causes and 
explore solutions with respect to such antagonizing constraints that can be generated through 
the exploration of divergences. It also appears that an explicit use of uncertainty as a source 
for argumentation in decision making situations can work to undermine the examination of 
knowledge and values, which is the exact opposite intent according to the AM criteria. 
Uncertainty should be a source for learning, not used as a strategic tool to subvert hazardous 
or antagonistic claims that imply risk taking. Naturally, this may be a solitary phenomenon, 
temporarily and spatially located to this particular MMG. However, as uncertainty is a widely 
recognized concept within the AM arena, there are reasons to suspect that the concept may be 
used through similar practices beyond this group which is also why it should be a target for 
further investigation.  
 
The second meeting that did not generate the material needed to correspond to the criteria 
used to distinguish discursive closures and openings, revealed through interviews to be due to 
two main reasons: (1) It was the first time this group met and the agenda for the meeting was 
more of a character to accentuate the format for future meetings rather than to discuss and 
make decisions, (2) the general perception appeared to be that the members share the same 
goals for the moose stock, be it hunters or landowners. Furthermore, the chairman of this 
group is also chairman of several other MMGs and s/he indicated later on that this particular 
meeting was unusually low-key. Furthermore, the members did not offer any indication that 
my own presence or my recording devices had any effect in the way they would have 
otherwise acted. For the time being, it can be assumed that when members in this type of 
meetings with divergent perspectives and values engage in dialogue or debate, discursive 
closures are a common practice. This assumption is partly based on what has been revealed 
from contact with chairmen from other groups when attempting to gain access to their 
meetings, during which it has been expressed that when members convene, they have already 
formed opinions and are unwilling to explore issues in more general terms, but nevertheless 
attend to engage in discourses to express their knowledge and values.  
The case presented here indicated no strict formal procedures for discussion, but even so, 
discursive closures were persistently practiced. The procedures for how to deal management 
issues in these meetings may vary, thus the reasons for discursive closures might be different 
as well. Accordingly, a wider scope of meetings needs to be subject for investigation to 
ascertain how well these types of groups meet the criteria for AM. In any case, the normative 
aspects for communication in SMM need to be cautiously examined as they appear to have 
been taken for granted, and this case is indicative of this concern. Previous research does not 
provide an ample descriptive fundament upon which such communicative practices are 
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achieved in practice and, accordingly, when situated opportunities for change actually 
emerge.   
 
The main issue that has arisen from this study and needs to be addressed is whether there are 
ways for members themselves to establish a procedural framework for communication that 
favors understanding for how to address the items that apparently require them to convene in 
meetings.   
 
The inaugural quote (p. 3) by Frances Westley epistemologically accentuated a 
conceptualized view of how management evolves through a process of merging different 
sources of knowledge, which in turn takes on new expressions which develop new forms for 
management. AM is rooted in this line of thinking and it entails how representations of 
knowledge is in constant motion, and faced with ever changing social and environmental 
situations, valuable knowledge for management has become perceived as a phenomenon that 
arises from the unexpected. It is thus when our perspectives change that we see situations in 
novel ways, allowing for new knowledge to emerge. For this to happen, we need to facilitate 
our ways of communicating rationally in order to approach our own and other’s perspectives 
openly, and to let creativity flourish so that we can learn to adapt.  
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